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Beyond Claim-Rights: Social Structure, Collectivization, and 
Human Rights
Elizabeth Kahn
1. Introduction
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights identifies a range of require-
ments that its authors agreed should be met for every human, out of respect 
for their inherent dignity (United Nations General Assembly 1948). Since the 
Declaration, the term “human right” has been used to identify particularly signifi-
cant, normative requirements of universal concern that should be met for individ-
uals everywhere, which should take priority over most other moral and political 
concerns. Yet many philosophical accounts of the concept of a “right” struggle to 
accommodate all of the requirement identified in the Declaration. These accounts 
take human rights to be Hohfeldian claim-rights: claims to action or omission 
owed by some agent (or agents) to the right holder, such that the fulfillment of the 
correlative duty (or duties) constitutes the fulfillment of the right (Hohfeld 1913, 
32; O’Neill 2005, 430, Cruft 2012, 137, Collins 2016, 701). When understood to 
be interpersonal claim-rights, the difficulty comes in identifying which persons 
have the correlative duties (O’Neill 2005), whereas when understood to be claim-
rights held by each individual against their own government, the problem is that 
many governments lack the ability to fulfill all of these claims for all of their 
residents (Cranston 1983).
In response to these difficulties, this paper argues that human rights should 
not be understood to be Hohfeldian claim-rights (Hohfeld 1913) and instead pro-
poses the adoption of an account of the concept that does not tie these rights 
directly to duties owed to the rights holder. According to this account, recogniz-
ing certain requirements to be a matter of human rights entails two things. First, 
that the importance of the individual interests that these requirements protect is 
sufficient to justify governing agencies prioritizing the social guarantee of these 
standards over most other concerns. Second, that the importance of meeting these 
standards equally for every contemporary person is sufficient to justify weighty 
pro-tanto duties on all moral agents to make considerable efforts to achieve and 
maintain a sociopolitical order in which they are socially guaranteed for every-
one.1 It is noted that such an approach can include social structural standards as 
human rights requirements: recognizing a subset of the requirements of structural 
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justice that are of particular moral significance, warrant universal concern, take 
relative priority, and should be socially guaranteed equally for individuals every-
where due to their inherent dignity.
The paper makes two points in favor of this understanding of human rights 
over Hohfeldian claim-right approaches. First, the approach recommended here 
can include all of the human rights recognized in the Declaration and thus does a 
better job of reflecting how the term is used in contemporary times. Second, the 
account does not lead to the exclusion of human rights that it will take collectiv-
ization to achieve for all humans in contemporary times.2 Thus, the account pro-
posed here avoids restricting what can be recognized as a particularly significant, 
normative requirement of universal concern that should be socially guaranteed 
for individuals everywhere, and which should take relative priority over most 
other concerns (the role that human rights have come to play in contemporary 
discourse) on the basis of what can currently be achieved for every contemporary 
human without the development of new agencies.
The paper challenges those who favor a Hohfeldian claim-right approach to 
human rights to take up one of the following options. First option: adapt their ac-
count so as to be able to recognize important individualistically justified priorities 
of justice that at present require collectivization to be fulfilled for all contemporary 
humans. Second option: come up with a justification for the prioritization of the indi-
vidualistically justified requirements of justice their accounts do recognize over basic 
requirements of social justice, that should be secured for individuals everywhere, 
that currently require collectivization to be achieved for every contemporary human.
1.1. Preliminaries
This paper considers how the concept of a human right should be understood: 
what it means to claim that something is a human right and what role these claims 
should play in normative reasoning. The grounds on which something can be 
established to be a human right are deliberately left open: the paper does not seek 
to explain the form that a justification of a human right must take.3
It is human rights as moral rights rather than legal rights that this paper is 
concerned with. The Universal Declaration is interpreted as aiming to identify 
pre-existing moral rights that are not dependent on a particular legal convention 
for their validity (in keeping with Raz 2010; Collins 2016).
The criteria used to evaluate the concept of a human right in this paper will 
now be given. The aim of this paper is to come up with a morally appealing con-
cept that can make sense of the Declaration and contemporary discourse, hence 
fidelity is identified as a virtue. However, this does not exclude the possibility that 
a philosophical conceptualization of the concept of a “human right” can require 
some reform of how the term is currently used (following Tasioulas 2012). In ad-
dition, an account of the concept must be consistent (not internally contradictory) 
and morally plausible (must give intuitive rulings with regard to what constitutes 
the violation of a human right, and so on). Finally, the concept must have some 
valuable role to play in our normative discourse and social practices (utility).
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1.2. Structure
The paper begins by offering evidence that the term “human right” is cur-
rently used to identify particularly significant, normative requirements of uni-
versal concern that should be met for individuals everywhere, and which should 
take priority over most other moral and political concerns. It then outlines how, in 
philosophical literature, human rights are often taken to be universal Hohfedian 
claim-rights. Sections 4 and 5 outline interpersonal and governmental Hohfeldian 
claim-right accounts of the concept, respectively, and note the difficulties they 
face in recognizing all of the human rights identified in the Declaration.
Sections 2-5 together argue that, given the current usage of the term, accept-
ing either of these Hohfeldian claim-right accounts results in the restriction of the 
list of particularly significant, normative requirements of universal concern that 
should be met for individuals everywhere (out of respect for their inherent dignity), 
which should take priority over most other moral and political concerns. These 
sections suggest that if having adequately specifiable correlative duties—the ful-
fillment of which constitutes the fulfillment of the right—is an existence condition 
for a human right (as the Hohfeldian Claim-Right account suggests), we must re-
ject a large number of the human rights listed in the Declaration and Covenants.45
In response to this problem, it is then proposed that instead of rejecting many 
of the human rights currently recognized (as O’Neill 2005 recommends) the idea 
that human rights must be Hohfeldian claim-rights should be rejected (contra 
Cranston, O’Neill, Tomalty, Cruft and Collins). The paper then suggests that we 
understand human rights to be particularly significant, individualistically justi-
fied, requirements of justice which take priority over most other normative con-
cerns. According to this account, stating that meeting these standards is a matter 
of human rights involves two claims. First, it means that the significance of the in-
terests that these requirements protect for every contemporary human is sufficient 
to justify governing agents prioritizing the social guarantee of these standards 
for everyone. Second, that meeting these requirements for every contemporary 
person is important enough to justify demanding that other moral agents make 
considerable efforts to secure and maintain a sociopolitical order in which these 
standards are socially guaranteed.6
It is then noted that such an understanding allows us to include as human 
rights, standards that currently require coordinated action to be achieved for all 
contemporary humans. It is pointed out that the proposed account is not limited 
(in the recognition of what individuals should have as a matter of human rights) 
by the abilities of existing agents acting unilaterally. However, it is noted that it is 
restricted by what existing agents can be reasonably expected to achieve through 
coordination and collectivization in the medium term. It is then pointed out that 
the proposed account can include social structural requirements within human 
rights: recognizing a subset of demands of social structural justice that are of 
particular significance, are of universal concern, that should be met equally for 
individuals everywhere and should take priority over most other moral concerns.7 
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The relationship between human rights and duties is then explained before the 
account is defended from objections.
2. Human Rights Discourse
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that the “recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” 
and that “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law.” This implies a need to secure human rights through 
law and links the denial of human rights to extreme forms of injustice. The NGO 
Amnesty International takes its central mission to be “campaigning for a world 
where human rights are enjoyed by all,” in focusing their humanitarian efforts 
around working toward the universal fulfillment of these rights they recognize the 
importance and priority of these rights (2015; 2017).8
Article 2 of the Declaration states that “everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without distinction of any kind,” and 
notes that the nationality and jurisdiction in which an individual resides cannot 
be used to exclude them from having equal rights. This point is reiterated by 
the Commissioner’s office describing human rights as rights “that all are equally 
entitled to without discrimination” (United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
High Commissioner 1996–2020). Later in the Declaration, Article 28 outlines 
that everyone is entitled to a “social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
Article 29 specifies that “in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the gen-
eral welfare in a democratic society,” implying that human rights are of relative 
priority: that they should only give way to other human rights or other extremely 
weighty common moral concerns (United Nations General Assembly 1948).
This suggests that human rights are understood by the Declaration’s authors, 
international governance agencies and NGOS to be particularly significant re-
quirements of justice, of universal concern, that should be fulfilled for individu-
als everywhere without discrimination, as a matter of inherent dignity, that take 
relative priority over other normative requirements, and should be protected by 
law.
3. Hohfeldian Claim-Rights
Many philosophical accounts of human rights take them to be Hohfeldian 
claim-rights: claims to action or omission owed by some agent (or agents) to the 
right holder, such that the fulfillment of the correlative duty (or duties) constitutes 
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the fulfillment of the right (O’Neill 2005, 430, Cruft 2012, 137, Collins 2016, 
701). This means that “whenever a claim-right is invaded a duty has been vio-
lated” (Hohfeld 1913, 32). In the sections that follow, two possible versions of the 
Hohfeldian claim-right approach to human rights are discussed. The first account 
(discussed in Section 2.2) identifies human rights as interpersonal claim-rights 
that correlate with duties for other individuals. The second account (discussed in 
Section 2.3) identifies human rights as claims that state governments must fulfill. 
These sections show how both accounts have difficulties accommodating the full 
set of rights recognized in the Declaration.
4. Interpersonal Accounts
Interpersonal accounts take human rights to be a subset of interpersonal 
moral claim-rights that are defined by some aspects of their nature. They rec-
ognize the primary correlative duties with regard to these rights as falling on 
other individuals. According to this approach, human rights are claims that every 
individual can make which correlate with duties that are owed to that individual 
by other individuals. Interpersonal accounts typically recognize governments as 
having secondary duties to enforce the primary duties that correlate with rights 
(O’Neill 2005). This approach is known as traditional when it is coupled with the 
idea that what justifies these rights is some empirical fact or facts about humans 
or humanity (Tasioulas 2012).9
The following section identifies how interpersonal accounts restrict what can 
be recognized as being a human right in such a way as to exclude many of the 
rights identified in the Universal Declaration, and thus fail to reflect practice. It 
then argues that this approach, in combination with the way the contemporary 
discourse understands the term, leads to the prioritization of some requirements 
of justice over others.
4.1. Problem
Interpersonal accounts can easily recognize human rights that correlate with 
negative duties to refrain from taking action, such as rights to be free from slav-
ery, torture, and religious persecution, which correlate with universal negative 
duties not to keep slaves, torture, or persecute based on religion. Broader interper-
sonal models can also recognize human rights that correlate with positive duties 
to take action, as long as it is clear who must act and how they must act so as to 
fulfill the right. Such accounts require that we can identify duty bearers for each 
right and indicate what the right requires them to do (Tomalty 2014). Thus, it 
appears that such accounts can recognize the socioeconomic rights recognized in 
the international Declaration. However, on closer investigation it becomes clear 
that some of these rights cannot meet claimability requirements for all contem-
porary humans (Tomalty 2014; Collins 2016). To see why, consider the human 
right to health. When an individual suffers from a health problem, it is not always 
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clear who should fulfill their claim to healthcare, how they must fulfill the claim, 
nor the extent to which they must do so. This is in part because how an outcome 
should be achieved depends on concrete circumstances: what healthcare facili-
ties exist in the local area, who has the requisite skills to provide treatment, and 
what the cost of taking the action required is for different agents (O’Neill 2005). 
In some cases, it can even be sensible for some conveniently placed individual 
to take immediate action, and then for others to compensate that individual later 
in order to prevent them being unfairly worse off as a result (Barry and Øverland 
2009). These complications make it difficult to specify duty bearers and duties in 
advance (Shue 1988). The existence of some identifiable duty bearer and identifi-
able duties (the fulfillment of which constitutes the fulfillment of the right) are 
necessary for there to be a human right according to the interpersonal claim-right 
account. Thus, it restricts what can be identified as a human right. This means that 
interpersonal accounts cannot reflect contemporary human rights discourse and 
practice in recognizing a broad range of rights.
To resolve this problem, governments could be recognized as needing to 
allocate duties to various individuals to educate, sanitize, provide healthcare and 
contribute to the costs of providing these services.10 However, this cannot resolve 
the issue with the interpersonal account of human rights because it means that in 
the absence of government allocation there will be no correlative duties and sub-
sequently there will be no rights. Currently, in some regions of the world, duties 
to provide these things have not been allocated by authorities (O’Neill 2005). 
From this, it follows that not all contemporary humans have these rights. This is 
both inconsistent with the meaning of human rights identified in Section 2.1 and 
morally problematic.
We could attempt to solve the problem by identifying governments as hav-
ing the correlative duties with regard to human rights (Nickel 1993; Beitz 2009; 
Tomalty 2014). Adopting such an approach moves us away from the interper-
sonal account and toward a governmental account (the subject of Section 5).
4.2. Analysis
As shown in Section 2, in contemporary times, human rights are understood 
to be significant normative requirements of universal concern that should be met 
for individuals everywhere (out of respect for their inherent dignity), which take 
priority over most other moral and political concerns. This understanding, cou-
pled with the interpersonal claim-right account, means that the list of norma-
tive priorities worthy of universal concern that should be fulfilled for individuals 
everywhere without discrimination, as a matter of inherent dignity, are restricted 
on the basis of a technical requirement regarding the form these requirements 
must take. This is done without substantive argument being given as to why only 
these requirements should be recognized as priorities of justice that should be 
fulfilled for individuals everywhere that are of universal concern. In response 
to this problem, supporters of interpersonal claim-right accounts need to give a 
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substantive argument regarding why it is that only requirements that can fulfill 
the interpersonal claimability requirement can be recognized as particularly sig-
nificant requirements of justice, of universal concern, that should be fulfilled for 
individuals everywhere without discrimination, as a matter of inherent dignity, 
that take relative priority over other normative requirements.
In response to this challenge, they could argue that, in moral discussion, we 
need to distinguish threats to inherent dignity that result from impermissible ac-
tions and omissions from those that do not result from some individual not ful-
filling duties they owe to particular others. However, recognizing this fact does 
not mean that addressing threats to individuals that result from the impermissible 
action or omission of another agent should always take priority over addressing 
threats that do not originate in duty violation by some identifiable individual. 
Nor does it give us any reason to think that only these sorts of problems are of 
universal concern.11
Another response open to the defender of an interpersonal approach is to sug-
gest that human rights do not outline all of the demands of justice owed equally to 
individuals everywhere that are of international concern, are required as a matter 
of inherent dignity, and take priority to some extent over other aims and ideals. 
Along these lines, O’Neill calls on people to recognize that the demands of social 
justice that are not a matter of human rights are important and can be global in 
scope (O’Neill 1986; 2016). Similarly, Griffin explains that the term “human 
right” does not capture all priorities of justice owed to individuals of international 
concern but instead specifies a set of demands that fall into a category historically 
understood to be important (Griffin 2001). Such approaches are morally plausi-
ble and internally consistent; however, they require us to diverge significantly 
from dominant contemporary understandings of what human rights are. These ac-
counts do not recognize human rights as outlining all the particularly significant, 
normative requirements of universal concern that should be met for individuals 
everywhere (out of respect for their inherent dignity), which should take priority 
over most other moral and political concerns. In doing so, they exclude many of 
the internationally recognized human rights listed in the Declaration and cove-
nants. Thus, they betray fidelity: they are not accounts of the concept appealed to 
in contemporary documents, discourses and practices.12
5. Governmental Accounts
In response to these problems, an approach that recognizes states as the cor-
relative duty bearers with regard to human rights could be adopted (as recom-
mended in Tomalty 2014).13 Doing so reflects important aspects of contemporary 
human rights practice (Beitz 2009): UN institutions hold governments responsi-
ble for the state of human rights in their territory, requiring them to meet many 
human rights standards, and criticizing any regression on human rights under 
their rule (Brems 2009), while NGOs use human rights standards to hold authori-
ties to account (Amnesty International 2015).14
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It may appear that an account that recognizes the government of a jurisdic-
tion as holding the correlative duties with regard to the human rights of residents 
can include more of the rights recognized in the Declaration and thus better re-
flects the concept appealed to in contemporary discourse. We can require gov-
ernments to socially guarantee a range of interests. We often expect governments 
to protect people from threats, organize society so as to secure certain goods are 
available to everyone under their jurisdiction, provide decent social conditions 
and opportunities for all residents, and ensure that individuals are not vulnerable 
to being treated by other agents in ways that undermine their inherent dignity. 15 
However, once we move away from an idealized understanding of government 
to examine the political reality, we can see that this approach (insofar as it insists 
human rights are Hohfeldian claim-rights) must either restrict what can be rec-
ognized as a human right in a way that excludes many internationally recognized 
human rights (undermining fidelity), or lead to morally implausible conclusions 
that conflict with key elements of the concept recognized in international practice 
(undermining fidelity and moral plausibility).
5.1. Problem
The key problem with understanding human rights to be Hohfeldian claim-
rights, which correlate with governments’ duties, is that many governments lack 
the ability to fulfill all of the requirements outlined in the Declaration and cov-
enants for all their residents (Cranston 1983). A government’s power is always 
limited by internal and external factors; due to the level of restriction they face, 
the governments of many states are unable to fulfill all of the rights recognized in 
the Universal Declaration and claimed across the world.
Some governments lack the ability to effectively fulfill any human rights: 
for example, since 1991, Somalia’s central government has lost the ability to 
enforce law and thus has little chance of securing any rights (Menkhaus 2003; 
2007). When it comes to socioeconomic human rights such as health and edu-
cation, many lower income governments face immense difficulties in fulfilling 
these rights for every person under their jurisdiction. In 2016, 40 countries had 
a Gross National Income per capita below 7,500 dollars, and 22 below 2,000 
dollars (World Bank 2017). These low national incomes make it impossible for 
governments to run adequate basic health and education systems for their popula-
tion without outside assistance.
Even when state populations have sufficient income to provide basic health-
care and primary education for all residents, doing so may still be impossible 
for their governments. Research indicates that only 25% of countries collect tax 
payments effectively, due to: having few resources and personnel, the informal 
nature of their economies, tax competition between states and difficulties at-
tracting sufficient investment (Dietsch and Rixen 2014; Carnahan 2015; Dietsch 
2015; Laborde and Ronzoni 2015; Van Apeldoorn 2018). This suggests that state 
governments are unable to collect sufficient taxation to fulfill human rights. In 
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these states, residents could directly pay for health, education, and sanitation ser-
vices, but this would require the existence of suppliers selling these services at 
affordable rates and all residents having sufficient income to purchase such ser-
vices. This is unlikely without redistributive taxation and widespread education 
(Gustafsson and Johansson 1999), which in turn requires a state able to tax and 
redistribute income.
5.2. Responses
An advocate of a governmental account could recognize a severely truncated 
list of human rights requirements that every government can reasonably be ex-
pected to comply with, sacrificing many of the rights outlined in the convention 
on economic, cultural, and social rights.16 This involves a substantial shift away 
from the existing use of the term, undermining fidelity (Valentini 2012). Worse 
still, it involves restricting what can be required as a matter of human rights on the 
basis of the limits of what all existing governments can reasonably be expected to 
achieve through unilateral action.
In response to the problem of inability, we could instead adopt an account of 
human rights that includes the concept of “progressive realization”: recognizing 
that state governments which are unable to fulfill human rights in the short term 
should just work toward their full realization over time. In addition, we could 
identify a “common core” of human rights that all state governments must imme-
diately fulfill.
This strategy offers a promising route for identifying the duties that state 
governments have with regard to the human rights of their residents. However, 
it is not acceptable as an account of the human rights themselves, because it cre-
ates a two-tier system in which some humans have immediate claims to health-
care and education while others only have claims to efforts toward improving 
access to healthcare and education long-term. If we understand human rights to 
be Hohfeldian claim-rights owed by governments to their residents and recognize 
poorer state governments as having only duties of progressive realization, then it 
follows that people in poorer countries do not actually have human rights to health 
or education but only human right to governmental efforts to improve health and 
education.17 Understanding socioeconomic human rights as claims to fulfillment 
in some cases and claims to progressive realization in others undermines the idea 
that all people have a right to equal human rights. As shown in Section 2.1, the 
fact that human rights should apply equally to all people regardless of nationality 
or state of residence is an important aspect of these rights. An account that rec-
ognizes some as having a right to health and education and others merely a right 
to efforts to improve health and education means that what an individual has a 
right to depends on whether a person’s state is rich or poor. This sort of inequal-
ity is explicitly ruled out in the Declaration. Thus, progressive realization as an 
approach to human rights (understood to be Hohfeldian claim-rights) moves us 
away from an important and morally appealing aspect of human rights.18
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Instead of lessening rights when we lessen our expectations of state govern-
ments, we could instead use human rights standards as a means of critiquing the 
existing system and the limited power to bring about basic standards that some 
governments currently have within it. We should use human rights to criticize 
the status quo and demand reform so that the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Declaration can be fully realized for every contemporary human, as Article 28 
requires (Pogge 2000).
Another possible solution to the inability of some states’ governments to pro-
vide basic rights for their citizens is to recognize that when state governments are 
unable to fulfill human rights duties, powerful collective agents, such as NGOs, 
foreign governments, or transnational corporations, have a responsibility to step 
in and fulfill rights.19 This means human rights are claims against state govern-
ments (owed to rights-holding residents) unless the government is unable to fulfill 
these claims in which case they pass to any existing collective able to fulfill them.
It is plausible to suggest that powerful collective agents have moral reason to 
step in and deliver human rights in times of crisis. However, it is not clear that just 
any collective able to fulfill a human right for a person, who lacks a government 
able to deliver that right, has a correlative duty to fulfill the right that is owed to 
the rights holder. Furthermore, in some cases, there will be no collective agent sit-
uated so as to be able to fulfill human rights, while discharging their other duties. 
This means there are likely to still be cases in which people have no agent from 
which to claim their right and thus will have no right on a Hohfeldian claim-right 
understanding. A final problem is that NGOS, multinationals, and foreign gov-
ernments are not appropriate permanent deliverers of human rights: they do not 
meet procedural standards required to legitimately fulfill human rights. Thus, al-
though recognizing that powerful agents have duties to assist fulfillment in times 
of state failure is plausible, it is not a strategy that can be used to rescue the idea 
that human rights are Hohfeldian claim-rights held by all contemporary humans.
6. Beyond Claimability
In light of the difficulties identified with interpersonal and governmental 
claim-right accounts, we could embrace an approach that does not require human 
rights to be Hohfeldian claim-rights. I propose that we instead understand human 
rights to be, individualistically justified priorities of justice that our systems of 
governance should be reformed in order to socially guarantee for every human. 
According to my account, meeting these standards for every contemporary human 
is important enough to justify burdensome duties to work with others to establish 
and maintain a political order in which these standards are socially guaranteed for 
every human. In an extension of Raz’s understanding of the term “right,” accord-
ing to this account, when we recognize a human right we recognize that an agent 
able to have rights has an interest20 that is significant enough to indirectly justify 
duties for other agents (Raz 1984).21
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The discussion of human rights discourse in Section 2.1 suggested that human 
rights are particularly significant requirements of justice, of universal concern, 
that should be fulfilled for individuals everywhere without discrimination, as a 
matter of inherent dignity, that take relative priority over other normative require-
ments, and should be protected by law. The account I am now proposing specifies 
that these requirements of justice protect individual interests that are significant 
enough to justify weighty duties to act responsively with a view to securing their 
fulfillment by creating, reforming, or supporting governance-arrangements that 
socially guarantee these rights.
According to my account, the primary duties that human rights ground are 
pro-tanto collectivization duties. Collectivization duties require agents to respond 
intelligently to each other’s actions so as to achieve a particular state of affairs 
(Collins 2013). In the case of human rights, collectivization duties require people 
to act responsively with a view to socially guaranteeing the right in question. A 
right is socially guaranteed if—and only if—social institutions avoid depriving 
people of the substance of a right, reliably protect people from being deprived of 
the substance of their right by other agents, and reliably ensure that people enjoy 
the substance of their right (building on Shue 1996, 17, 75).
As collectivization duties do not specify what each individual must do, the 
rights that give rise to these duties cannot meet claimability requirements (see 
Collins 2016). However, this lack of specificity does not mean we cannot assess 
whether or not the individual interests that ground human rights are important 
enough to justify weighty collectivization duties.
The collectivization duties individuals have with regard to human rights must 
be pro-tanto duties because, in some circumstances, agents will have good reason 
not to work toward securing an order that socially guarantees these rights. For ex-
ample, individuals cannot be reasonably required to make such efforts when they 
live under an oppressive government that persecutes human rights advocates.
The account proposed here is in keeping with Shue’s recommendation that 
we recognize “indirect duties” falling on individuals, to support, reform, or de-
sign and create institutions that fulfill human rights (Shue, 1988, 696–97, 703). 
The major advantage of the approach is that by understanding human rights as 
primarily grounding collectivization duties we do not restrict what can be counted 
as a human right on the basis of what existing agents can be expected to achieve 
without coordination or the creation of new collective agents.
6.1. Social Structural Standards
The proposed approach can include social structural requirements within 
human rights, even when some contemporary humans lack legitimate governing 
agents able to immediately secure these standards for them. In including require-
ments for social structures, the account follows domestic accounts of justice in 
focusing on the way in which major social practices come together to have a 
pervasive impact on peoples’ lives (Rawls 1972): affecting their opportunities, 
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conditioning their probability of success, and attaching different weights (ben-
efits and burdens) to the choices available to them (Olsaretti 2009). Social struc-
ture is as “a way of looking at the whole of society rather than a particular part of 
it” (Young 2011), a “basic sociology of a society” (Julius 2003) that persists over 
time as it is reproduced (often unconsciously) by the actions of individuals who 
are, for the most part, pursuing their own projects within the existing structure.
Structural human rights requirements recognize a subset of requirements 
of social structural justice that are particularly significant, justified on the basis 
of the interests of individuals, are owed equally to all individuals as a matter 
of inherent dignity, take relative priority, and are significant enough to ground 
weighty pro-tanto collectivization duties to socially guarantee them.
By including social structural requirements within human rights, we can rec-
ognize that the human right to health requires that no human is positioned within 
the social structure in such a way as to make them unacceptably vulnerable to 
ill health. This means that they must have secure and robust access to adequate 
health care services, sanitary living conditions, safe working conditions (or other 
safe opportunities to make a living), and a natural and social environment that 
does not undermine their health.
The proposed account of human rights can include the full range of rights 
outlined in the Declaration and covenants: identifying the social conditions in 
which humans should live, the goods and services they should have secure ac-
cess to, the status and treatment they should be afforded by legal and political 
systems, and the standard threats to inherent dignity from with they should be 
robustly secure.22 Furthermore, it means that whether or not these rights should 
be recognized can be determined by considering whether we have good reason to 
think that they are individualistically justified, priorities of justice that should be 
fulfilled for individuals everywhere due to their inherent dignity, that are of uni-
versal concern, and are sufficiently important to justify weighty collectivization 
duties to socially guarantee their fulfillment as a priority.
The account shares similarities with the institutional approach advocated by 
Pogge, in that it recognizes that human rights concern social organization and re-
quire institutional orders to fulfill certain standards (Pogge 1995; 2008; 2010).23 
It is in keeping with the idea that recognizing a human right to X means recog-
nizing that society should be organized so that all humans have secure access to 
X (Pogge 2008, 70). The account proposed here recognizes that individuals have 
duties to work toward ensuring social and political institutions are such that rights 
are secure, although these duties do not correlate with rights in a straightforward 
way.
Pogge recognizes human rights as concerning the nature of institutional order 
and holds state governments (and the citizenry or at least the more powerful mem-
bers of the citizenry) to be responsible for securing human rights in their terri-
tory (Pogge 1995; 2008, 64). However, he also identifies the imposition of the 
global institutional order as an institutional violation of the human rights of the 
global poor by the G7 and their citizens (Pogge 2008, 178–83; 2010, 10–56). The 
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approach proposed here suggests that, in addition to recognizing that domestic 
and international institutional orders should not cause avoidable human rights 
deficits, we need to ensure that the global social structure that emerges from do-
mestic, international, global, and transnational practices, trends, and rules is such 
that it does not violate rights (Ashford 2018). This means we need to ensure that it 
does not make individuals vulnerable to threats to their interests in a way that un-
dermines their inherent dignity. The account proposed suggests that our primary 
focus should be on how the social structure positions agents. This structure results 
from practices, policies and trends that are domestic, international, transnational 
and global.
6.2. Non-Correlative Collectivization Duties
According to my account, human rights do not straightforwardly correlate 
with duties for agents. This means that human rights are not valid claims to the 
performance of a duty, or a number of duties, the performance of which is owed 
to the right holder. However, part of recognizing that individuals have a human 
right to these standards being met, is acknowledging that the importance of meet-
ing these standards for everyone is significant enough to justify requiring moral 
agents to take on significant burdens. This looser understanding of the connection 
between human rights and duties allows us to recognize multiple duties with re-
gard to any particular right (in keeping with Shue 1988; 1996).
Individuals cannot, on their own, fulfill or violate structural human rights 
requirements. However, groups of individuals can influence the fulfillment or 
violation of these standards. The primary duties individuals have with regard to 
structural human rights requirements are collectivization duties. These require 
moral agents to act responsively with a view to establishing and maintaining col-
lective agencies that socially guarantee these rights, or to act upon existing col-
lective agencies so that they socially guarantee these rights.
The term “collectivization duty” recognizes that agents can be morally 
obliged to take responsive steps with a view to addressing a morally pressing 
circumstance. This can be done either by transforming an existing collective, cre-
ating a new collective or coordinating action in a looser fashion. Collins develops 
the concept of a collectivization duty in order to explain the duties of moral agents 
in cases where collective action is required to resolve a morally urgent circum-
stances, no collective agent exists who is able to address the circumstance, and 
the circumstance cannot be addressed without either coordinating action, forming 
a collective agent with a decision-making mechanism or reforming an existing 
collective so that it addresses the circumstance (Collins 2013).24
This paper proposes that, with regard to social structural human rights re-
quirements, individuals primarily have collectivization duties. These duties 
require individuals to act responsively with a view to addressing the fact that 
human rights are not socially guaranteed for some contemporary people. Doing 
so will require bringing about collective agent(s) able to legitimately regulate and 
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intervene, so as to ensure that social structures do not place any social group in 
a position in which they are vulnerable to being deprived of the object of their 
human rights. Individuals also have duties to discharge any reasonable duties 
allocated to them by governing agents in order to meet human rights standards. 
But, according to my account, individuals also retain duties to monitor collective 
agents charged with socially guaranteeing human rights and collectivize to act 
upon these agents so as to ensure they discharge their duties as necessary.25
In justifying what human rights there are, there is a balance to be struck 
between what it is important for people to have as a matter of inherent dignity, 
and what it is reasonable to expect people to socially guarantee through collec-
tivization, and the formation and maintenance of political and social institutions. 
This balance requires (at a minimum) that the duties to work toward collectively 
securing human rights, in combination with other moral duties and reasonable 
ethical commitments, do not undermine any individual’s inherent dignity.
These collectivization duties are not correlative with human rights because 
it is not the case that an individual person’s individual human right is a claim on 
all obligated others to take action to collectivize so as to ensure the right is so-
cially guaranteed (as would be the case if the rights were a species of Hohfeldian 
claim-right). This is because an individual’s right is a claim to the actual social 
guarantee of their interest and not merely a claim to others making efforts to try 
to establish, maintain and support such a guarantee. It is also because it is not the 
importance of one individual’s human right that justifies each other person’s du-
ties to work towards a socio-political order that socially guarantees human rights. 
Rather, it is the total of all the human rights of all people that justify each person’s 
duty to collectivize so as to establish and maintain a sociopolitical order in which 
all human rights are socially guaranteed for all.
In addition, all moral agents will have duties not to take actions that threat-
ens or violates human rights. Although individuals acting alone cannot threaten 
the structural aspects of human rights, individuals acting together, and powerful 
collective agents, can act in ways that undermine the fulfillment of structural 
human rights requirements. Thus, it is important to recognize that these agents 
have duties not to do so and individuals have duties not to take part in collective 
action that undermines the fulfillment of structural human rights requirements, at 
least when they can reasonably avoid doing so. ‘These duties are in addition to 
their basic duties not to violate human rights interactionally or institutionally as 
proposed in Pogge (2010).’
State governments have duties not to violate human rights. Where state gov-
ernments are effective and strong (and thus have the ability to regulate action 
and provide services so as to socially guarantee human rights), they have duties 
to ensure human rights standards are socially guaranteed for all those who are 
resident within the territory they rule. They also have duties not to take actions or 
adopt policies that undermine the ability of other governments to socially guar-
antee rights within their own jurisdiction. In addition, they have duties to act 
responsively with a view to establishing an international order in which rights can 
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reliably be delivered by legitimate authorities across the world. Where state gov-
ernments lack the ability to socially guarantee human rights for their residents, 
they have progressive realization duties that require they act responsively with a 
view to coordinating with other agencies in order to establish conditions in which 
they can effectively socially guarantee human rights in their jurisdiction.
7. Objections
Non claim-right approaches to human rights have been accused of outlining 
utopian goals rather than rights proper (Cranston 1983). It has also been sug-
gested that these purported rights are superfluous to moral reasoning because they 
play no distinct normative role (Tomalty 2014), that they do not constitute full 
moral principles (Meckled-Garcia 2009; 2013), and that they cannot properly ac-
commodate the notion of violation (Tomalty 2014). Below it is explained that the 
account proposed does indeed subvert the meaning of a “right” in a way that falls 
foul of some but not all of these accusations. However, it is argued that despite 
this, such rights serve a useful function in our contemporary discourse and thus 
the use of this moral concept can in fact be justified.
The approach proposed recognizes that the social guarantee of human rights 
will take sustained collaboration from multiple parties to be achieved. Socially 
guaranteeing these rights is a goal that individuals and collectives have duties to 
work toward together. It is worth noting that this fact does not put the concept at 
odds with how the term “human right” is utilized outside philosophical circles: 
the Declaration makes it clear that various agencies should work toward the ful-
fillment of rights, recognizes their fulfillment to be an “aspiration” and notes that 
they represent a “common standard of achievement” that should be pursued in co-
operation with the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly 1948). This 
suggests that fidelity actually gives us reason to embrace an account of human 
rights that identifies the social guarantee of these rights as an important goal for 
individuals and agencies (Beitz 2001).
However, it is vital to note that conceding this does not make human rights 
merely things it would be good to achieve. Under the proposed account, human 
rights are defined as especially significant normative standards required out of 
respect for each individual’s inherent dignity that take relative priority, are of 
universal concern, and are sufficiently weighty to justify a range of burdensome 
duties falling on a range of agents. It is also worth noting that this understanding 
does not make human rights a comprehensive utopian vision of the best society 
(thus making theories of justice redundant): these standards can be met in a num-
ber of different ways, and thus, they permit diversity of social formation.
The account of human rights supported here identifies them as justified in 
light of particularly important individual interests that are together sufficient to 
ground burdensome collectivization duties to establish and maintain an order in 
which they are socially guaranteed, as well as duties on governing agencies to 
socially guarantee these rights to the extent that they are able to do so.
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It could be objected that recognizing the rights themselves is redundant: we 
could simply identify a set of particularly significant human interests alongside a 
set of pressing duties to promote these interests in various ways (Tomalty 2014). 
However, human rights have an important role to play in moral practice: they 
offer a common language with which individuals around the world can articulate 
the serious injustices they face as individuals that require urgent attention from 
others around the world. Human rights are a set of standards that have been agreed 
to be of vital importance, which are sufficient to ground weighty duties to secure 
them by establishing and maintaining political institutions that socially guarantee 
them as a priority. These features of human rights have been established through 
a long and painful history and would be lost by changing how we refer to them.26 
It would be absurd to undermine this highly successful moral practice by talking 
only about interests and duties in order to be more ontologically minimalist. The 
moral utility of the practice of identifying individualistically justified, particularly 
important requirements of justice, gives us strong reason to continue the practice.
Furthermore, human rights discourse delivers something that talk of “univer-
sal human interests” does not. It recognizing that the importance of these interests 
requires that certain standards are socially guaranteed for each individual as a 
priority, notes that their not being guaranteed constitutes a grievous injustice and 
an affront to the rights holder, and that having these standards socially guaranteed 
is important enough to ground burdensome duties on others to work together to 
achieve it.
However, without an account of the burdens agents must assume in order 
to bring about these standards, it could be claimed that a human rights do not 
constitute a full moral principle (Meckled-Garcia 2009; 2013), and that without 
knowing who is obligated to do what with regard to socially guaranteeing them, 
we cannot assess whether it is reasonable to require they are socially guaranteed. 
Each of these problems will be considered in turn.
The account proposed here means that human rights do not constitute “full 
moral principles.” However, as requirements of justice, they are complete. 
Furthermore, the fact that they are not moral principles is a strength rather than a 
weakness of the account, or so I will argue.
There are several different accounts of the relationship between morality and 
justice that have been proposed in normative theory. According to one picture, 
implied by Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, morality concerns the norms individ-
uals should follow. These rules can be broken down into: those rules that should 
not be coercively imposed (norms of virtue) and those that should be coercively 
imposed (norms of justice) (Kant 1996).27 In contrast to this approach, the picture 
of the relationship between morality and justice endorsed here recognizes them to 
be two different types of normative evaluation. Morality is primarily concerned 
with evaluating the behavior of persons, whereas justice is primarily concerned 
with evaluating social structure. According to this account, justice primarily con-
cerns the way human actions and institutions come together to put groups into 
different positions in a social schema. This social structure has a pervasive impact 
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on peoples’ lives: constraining and enabling in ways that give advantage to some 
and disadvantage others and providing the backdrop within which they interact 
(Rawls 1972; Pogge 1989; Julius 2003; Young 2006).
At the very least, we need accounts of justice that can include the evaluation 
of social structure. This excludes adopting an account of justice that is restricted 
to evaluating individuals and collective agencies (including governments). 
Requiring that all demands of justice be “full moral principles” would prevent us 
from identifying cases of structural or background injustice whenever collective 
agents capable of regulation were yet to exist (Young 2006; Ronzoni 2009).
It is important to note that the account proposed here does not posit rights 
that have no connection at all to the duties. Recognizing something to be a human 
right involves recognizing that it is sufficiently important to ground duties for 
other agents (including collectivization duties that require responsive action 
aimed at establishing an order able to socially guarantee the right in question). 
Thus, the human rights discussed here do have an effect on the duties of agents; 
it is just not as direct as the connection between rights and duties posited by a 
Hohfeldian claim-right approach. When we evaluate the actions of individuals, 
we should consider what duties they have in relation to the social structures they 
live within and help to reproduce and when we evaluate governing agencies, we 
must evaluate their efforts to regulate social structure.
Furthermore, what can be recognized as a human right according to the ac-
count proposed here is constrained by what it is reasonable to demand that people 
achieve: we cannot recognize human rights that it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect people to collectively secure either because the necessary collectivization ef-
forts are too burdensome or the burdens that governance agencies would need to 
assign to secure structural change would be too burdensome. Thus, what can rea-
sonably be demanded of agents still restricts and limits what can be demanded as 
a matter of human rights. The difference is that what can be reasonably demanded 
includes collectivization and the creation of new agencies. Thus, what can be 
required is not restricted by what existing agents can reasonably be expected to 
achieve through un-coordinated action. Instead, we can recognize that existing 
agents should work together to achieve rights fulfillment even if this requires the 
creation of new agencies to be achieved.
One final worry about the proposed structural human rights is that for these 
rights there is often no agent who can be identified as a violator when they are not 
fulfilled. We might be concerned that losing the concept of violation undermines 
a powerful and vital part of human rights practice: holding authorities to account 
for human rights violations (Forst 2001; Ignatieff and Gutmann 2003; Amnesty 
International 2017). An approach that identifies state governments as primary 
duty bearers can hold government responsible for any failures to fulfill human 
rights standards within their jurisdiction, and it can use a human rights deficit to 
identify a state government as failing in its required role (Tomalty 2014).
When a social structure does not meet standards that are owed to individ-
uals, as a matter of human rights, the structure can be said to “violate” human 
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rights (Ashford 2018). This indicates that urgent reform is needed and suggests 
that agents must take action to reform the structure. However, the violation of a 
structural right does not always single out any agent as responsible for the failure: 
in cases where government lacks the ability to fulfill the standard, this approach 
does not isolate any party as being solely responsible for the deficit or its removal.
However, structural human rights standards do still lead to significant duties 
for governing agencies in all cases. These agencies must ensure domestic social 
structures meet human rights standards, as far as this is within their power to 
permissibly do so, alongside working with other agents to bring about an interna-
tional institutional order in which these standards can be fully met everywhere. 
Compliance or non-compliance with these duties can be monitored, and govern-
ments who fail in these duties can be criticized and held to account even if they 
cannot be held solely responsible (see Brems 2009).
Traditionally, human rights have played the important role of protecting 
populations from abuses of power by governments. The approach proposed here 
suggests that human rights, properly understood, should also protect individuals 
from social structures in which their most fundamental needs are insecure as well 
as those in which they are vulnerable to being subjected to treatment that under-
mines their dignity. This is a complex task that sometimes requires significant 
collaboration between various agents in order to be achieved. Where agents fail to 
fulfill the duties they have with regard to socially guaranteeing structural human 
rights requirements, they should face criticism, thus these rights still offer a 
means of criticizing governments (and other agents) that fail to fulfill their duties 
with regard to guarantee these rights, or take action that undermines these rights.
8. Conclusion
This paper has proposed that human rights are individualistically justified 
priorities of justice, of universal concern, that need not correlate directly with 
duties. According to this account, human rights outline: the social conditions in 
which agents must live, the goods and services they must be able to access, the 
standard threats they should be reliably protected from, and the procedural re-
quirements governance systems must meet out of respect for their inherent dig-
nity. These requirements are particularly significant, and warrant social guarantee 
as a matter of priority. They generate weighty pro-tanto collectivization duties for 
all other agents to work toward ensuring their social guarantee, as well as duties 
on governing agencies to provide such a guarantee to the extent that they are able 
to do so.
This paper has argued in favor of this account of human rights over a 
Hohfeldian claim-right approach, on the basis that it does not restrict what can 
be recognized as an individualistically justified normative priority of universal 
concern which warrants social guarantee, on the basis of the limits of the abilities 
of existing agents working unilaterally. It challenges those who favor an account 
that requires human rights to be direct specifiable claims to action or omission 
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from existing agents, to either adapt their accounts so they can recognize the full 
list of human rights identified in the Declaration, or come up with a substantive 
argument in support of the prioritization of the normative standards owed to indi-
viduals that they do recognize over other claims of fundamental justice owed to 
individuals everywhere that their model cannot include.
Thanks to Nina, Jan, Ryoa, and Lisa for organizing the issue, as well as 
the team at JSP. Many helpful colleagues assisted in the development of this 
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ECPR in Prague, and ECAP in Munich gave useful feedback on versions of the 
paper. Particular thanks to the three anonymous reviewers as well as Elizabeth 
Ashford, Jesse Tomalty, Lisa Herzog, Rutger Claasen, Merten Reglitz, and James 
Christensen, who offered helpful comments.
Notes
 1Building on Shue (1988 and 1996).
 2For a definition of collectivization, see Collins (2013).
 3Although the concept and grounds of human rights should be combined in full accounts of hu-
man rights, it is my contention that they can be disentangled (in keeping with Tasioulas 2012). 
The paper notes that the declaration appeals to the idea of “inherent dignity” to distinguish human 
rights. However, it does not explore how to identify which rights are a matter of inherent dignity.
 4Unless we adopt a more complex Hohfeldian claim-right account that is different to the interper-
sonal and governmental approaches explored here.
 5Some constitutional and legal human rights as well as many socioeconomic human rights must 
be rejected under the interpersonal and governmental accounts. This point was helpfully drawn 
to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.
 6The account endorsed here, has much in common with those proposed by Ashford (2006) and 
Shue (1996). Ashford’s suggests that we recognize positive and imperfect duties with regard to 
human rights. Adopting her account requires a different understanding of the relationship be-
tween rights and duties to the claim-rights approach.
 7Elizabeth Ashford has proposed there can be structural human rights violations (Ashford 2007)
 8This point was helpfully drawn to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.
 9The interpersonal account focusses on interactional violations of human rights by other persons 
(Pogge 1995; 2010).
 10Goodin suggests that morally important imperfect duties often should be turned into perfect 
duties by ’institutionalizing’ them so they become perfect duties (Goodin 2017). This institution-
alization makes them claimable.
 11For a defense of the strength and priority of some imperfect duties (that are taken to not cor-
relate with rights) over perfect duties, see Goodin (2017).
 12Buchannan argues that we should not assume that our favored account of moral human rights 
should dictate how the contemporary international practice of human rights must be, suggesting 
the current legal concept need not mirror a traditional moral concept at all (Buchanan 2013). In 
contrast to my approach, Buchannan takes human rights to be legal rights created by international 
covenants, declarations, and practices rather than taking the Declaration and covenants as seek-
ing to outline pre-existing moral rights.
 13Tomalty suggests they are claims against states—this proposal is interpreted here as recog-
nizing human rights to be claims against state governments. Alternatively, it could be that the 
citizenry rather than the government is the agent obliged to act. Many of the critiques of the 
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government approach discussed below also apply to this alternative interpretation.
 14I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
 15These agencies can be connected to accounts of individual duties by recognizing individual du-
ties to promote and support justice-ensuring institutions (Rawls 1972). The connection between 
collectives, institutions, and individual duties will be discussed later in the paper.
 16Rawls’ account of human rights includes only a short list of demands and does not include 
many of the socioeconomic human rights recognized in the Declaration or conventions. His theo-
ry gives an account of what to do with burdened societies which cannot fulfill these rights (Rawls 
1999).
 17Collins suggests that the need for claimability in combination with the limitations of current 
governments means that rather than a human right to subsistence we have a right to socioeconom-
ic consideration (Collins 2016).
 18Raz’s discussion of human rights suggests that people everywhere do not have all of the rights 
listed in the Declaration or at least do not have them equally. His account links there being a 
right to it being desirable that the right be legally recognized and coercively enforced by existing 
institutions. He points out that differences in institutions’ current abilities mean that what should 
be legally enforced is different in different locations, while the need for differences in delivery in 
different locales makes international adjudication unattractive (Raz 2010).
 19These are sometimes referred to as a secondary duties in a different meaning to that proposed 
by O’Neill (see Nickel 1993; O’Neill 2005). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who point-
ed out this option.
 20I am using the term “interest” broadly. I am not advocating a well-being account over an agency 
account but remaining neutral on this question. For more on this debate, see Nickel 2019.
 21However, this account is not compatible with Raz’s own account of human rights insofar as he 
ties them to the state system and links the existence of a human right to the desirability of making 
them coercively imposed, justiciable, legal rights enforced by existing governments (Raz 2010).
 22The idea that human rights concern standard threats comes from (Shue 1996) and is recognized 
in (Beitz 2009).
 23Pogge’s revised account (2010) recognizes that human rights can be violated interactionally 
(when an individual violates a right) as well as institutionally (when an individual makes un-
compensated contributions to the coercive imposition of an institutional order that foreseeably 
produces avoidable human rights deficits). The account proposed here recognizes these possibil-
ities but also recognizes that human rights can be violated structurally (in keeping with Ashford, 
2018). Unlike the account proposed here, Pogge’s account considers official disrespect of human 
rights to be especially significant (2008).
 24The account of collectivization duties with regard to human rights proposed here does not 
require there to be no collective able to address the circumstance in order for there to be collec-
tivization duties.
 25The proposed account differs from that outlined in Collins (2019).
 26This point was helpfully brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.
 27See (Miller 2007). Other approaches identify demands of justice as normative principles that 
governments (or other agents that claim to “act in the name of the people” or “have a monopoly 
on legitimate violence”) must fulfill (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005). A third approach identifies de-
mands of justice as principles that coercively imposed institutional orders should fulfill (Pogge 
2008; 2010). It is worth noting that the approach described here is Kantian too, along the lines of 
Kant’s argument regarding the duty to put oneself under a common law (see Reglitz 2019).
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